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Abstract— By adding carefully crafted perturbations to in-
put images, adversarial examples (AEs) can be generated to
mislead neural-network-based image classifiers. L2 adversarial
perturbations by Carlini and Wagner (CW) are regarded as
among the most effective attacks. While many countermeasures
against AEs have been proposed, detection of adaptive CW L2
AEs has been very inaccurate. Our observation is that those
deliberately altered pixels in an L2 AE, altogether, exert their
malicious influence. By randomly erasing some pixels from an
L2 AE and then restoring it with an inpainting technique,
such an AE, before and after the steps, tends to have different
classification results, while a benign sample does not show this
symptom. Based on this, we propose a novel AE detection
technique, Erase and Restore (E&R), that exploits the limitation
of L2 attacks. On two popular image datasets, CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet, our experiments show that the proposed technique is
able to detect over 98% of the AEs generated by CW and other
L2 algorithms and has a very low false positive rate on benign
images. Moreover, our approach demonstrate strong resilience
to adaptive attacks. While adding noises and inpainting each
have been well studied, by combining them together, we deliver
a simple, accurate and resilient detection technique against
adaptive L2 AEs.
I. INTRODUCTION
By adding deliberately crafted perturbations into a normal
image, an attacker is able to create an adversarial example
(AE), which misleads a neural-network-based classifier to
output an incorrect prediction result. Worse, the malicious
perturbations in an AE are so subtle that they are usually
human-imperceptible. As neural networks are increasingly
deployed, AEs raise crucial security concerns especially in
many vision-related applications.
To gauge such adversarial perturbations, Lp norms are
usually used to quantitatively describe the discrepancy be-
tween an original benign image Io and its corresponding
AE Ia. According to the value of p, the mainstream AE
generation algorithms can be categorized into three families:
L0, L2 and L∞ attacks. Informally, L0 measures the number
of modified pixels, L2 the Euclidean distance between the
two images, and L∞ the largest modification among all the
modified pixels.
In particular, L2 attacks by Carlini and Wagner (CW) [6]
“are among the most effective white-box attacks and should
be used among the primary attacks to evaluate potential
defences”[29]. Although researchers have proposed many
AE detection methods [21], [27], [26], [37] to assist the
protected neural networks in rejecting adversarial inputs,
recent studies [19], [5], [4] show that the detection usually
(a) Original image (b) Corrupted image (c) Restored image
Fig. 1: Restoring lost parts of an image with inpainting.
goes ineffective when facing adaptive CW L2 AEs. How
to accurately detect adaptive L2 AEs is still an unresolved
challenge. Thus, we focus on tackling L2 AEs in this work,
and our goal is a technique that not only detects L2 AEs but
is also resilient to adaptive attacks.
We have two key insights. First, we observe that those
deliberately corrupted pixels exert a malicious influence as
a whole. It implies that a destruction of the completeness of
the influence by all perturbed pixels may cause a failure of
the attack. Second, although destruction may also harm the
classification accuracy for benign samples, there exist very
effective inpainting techniques [34], [35], [25] in the image
processing area that can help restore a partially corrupted
image. For example, Figure 1(a) shows an original image.
Figure 1(b) presents a corresponding corrupted image where
many regions are erased. After inpainting, as shown in
Figure 1(c) the corrupted image is well restored.
Thus, we hypothesize that if we randomly erase quite
a few pixels from an AE and then apply inpainting to
the resulting AE, the AE attack will probably fail for two
reasons. First, discarding many small regions from an AE
will ruin the holistic adversarial influence formed by the
maliciously perturbed pixels. Second, the inpainting typically
restores the image in a benign way that does not uphold
the malicious influence. By contrast, if we apply the same
“Erase-and-Restore” (E&R) operations to a benign sample,
the classification results, before and after the steps, tend to
be identical, as inpainting by design is supposed to reverse
the deterioration to benign images.
Figure 2 illustrates our insights and observations using six
color images from CIFAR-10. A random mask (mask, for
short) in our work describes the locations of pixels that are
randomly erased. We randomly erase 5% of the pixels of
each image. The AEs are generated using the CW algorithm
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Fig. 2: Different impacts of the “Erase-and-Restore” (E&R) operations on AEs and benign samples.
(Section 2). As shown in Figure 2(a), the classification
results of each AE, before and after the E&R operations,
are different. By contrast, as shown in Figure 2(b), the
classification results of each benign sample, before and after
the steps, are the same. Our large-scale experiments also
show consistent results (Section 4).
We consider the sensitivity to E&R operations as an
exploitable characteristic of L2 AEs. Based on this, we
propose a very simple AE detection approach: given an
image, if the classification results before and after E&R vary,
it is an AE; otherwise, a benign sample. We accordingly
implement an AE detector, named THEMIS, to thwart attacks
created by state-of-the-art L2 AE generation techniques. Our
proposed detector applies the E&R operations to inputs, and
is further enhanced by the idea of generating multiple sam-
ples. Specifically, given an image I0, we generate n images
by randomly erasing some pixels of I0 each time, to create a
sequence of images {I1, I2, · · · , In}. For each deteriorated
image, the locations of the erased pixels are described in a
mask. Next, an inpainting technique is leveraged to restore
the erased pixels based on masks and obtain the restored
images {I ′1, I ′2, · · · , I ′n}. Finally, a classifier makes use of
the prediction result of I0 and those of the restored images
to determine whether I0 is an AE.
We have evaluated our system using the popular image
datasets CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. While both leading L2 AE
generation methods, CW [6] and DeepFool [28], are consid-
ered in the evaluation, we lay special emphasis on CW [6]
because it can circumvent all existing detectors, especially
when adaptive attacks are considered. Our experiments show
that the proposed detection technique is very effective. Take
the CW [6] attack as an example, on the CIFAR-10 dataset,
THEMIS can detect 99.8% AEs with a false positive rate
(FPR)=0, and on ImageNet, it can detect 98.4% AEs with
FPR = 1.4%. More importantly, it shows high resilience to
adaptive attacks.1 The key contributions of our work include:
• We identify an interesting characteristic of L2 AEs,
whose classification results vary sharply when erasing
and restoring operations are applied. Meanwhile, benign
samples are not so sensitive. We exploit this distinction
1All the code and data in this paper will be open sourced.
and propose a simple but very effective approach—
“Erase and Restore”—to detecting AEs.
• We employ the idea of sampling to enhance the pro-
posed detection approach. By applying E&R to an
input for multiple times, richer features are generated
to improve the detection accuracy. Moreover, for each
sample, the erased pixels are randomly selected, which
makes the approach highly unpredictable from the per-
spective of attackers.
• We implement this approach in our detector THEMIS
and evaluate it on two popular datasets, CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet. The experiment results show that THEMIS
outperforms prior techniques and achieves the highest
detection accuracy.
• The enormous randomness and the non-differentiable
nature are inherent strengths of our detection approach,
which make it difficult for an adversary to circumvent
THEMIS. The evaluation results corroborate that our
system is highly resilient to adaptive attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce
some background and the threat models in Section 2, and
the experimental setup in Section 3. Section 4 describes
our proposed approach. We present the evaluation results
in Section 5. We evaluate the resilience of the proposed
technique under adaptive attacks in Section 6. The related
work is reviewed in Section 7. We discuss our work and
draw conclusions in Section 8 and Section 9, respectively.
II. BACKGROUND AND THREAT MODELS
A. Attack Algorithms
Adversarial attacks can be categorized as either non-
targeted or targeted ones. The aim of a non-targeted attack
is to make the input be classified as any arbitrary class
except the correct one. By contrast, the aim of a targeted
attack is a specific attacker-desired, but actually incorrect,
prediction result. Next, we briefly describe two leading L2
AE generation methods.
1) Carlini & Wagner Attacks: Carlini and Wagner [6]
designed a group of targeted AE generation methods which
are denoted as CW attacks. According to the distance metrics
adopted in an optimization target, CW attacks can be divided
into three types: L0-, L2- and L∞-norm. In this paper, we
mainly examine CW L2 attacks, which are the most difficult
to detect [19], [4].
Due to a few creative designs, the CW attacks achieve
performance superior to other attack methods. The first and
foremost innovative design is using a logits-based objective
function rather than softmax-cross-entropy loss, which plays
a key role in the resilience improvement of the attack against
defensive distillation [30]. Secondly, this algorithm maps
the target variable to a space of the inverse trigonometric
function, so that the problem is suitable to be solved by a
modern optimizer, e.g. Adam [20]. Finally, a confidence-level
parameter κ is introduced; as κ increases, the model classifies
the resulting AE as the attacker-desired label more likely,
giving the attacker flexibility to make a trade-off between
the degree of perturbations and misclassification probability.
2) DeepFool: Moosavi et al. [28] developed the DeepFool
attack that is used to create non-targeted AEs. The algo-
rithm utilizes an iterative linearization of the classifier to
generate L2 minimization-based perturbations. To simplify
the problem, the neural networks are imagined to be linear,
so that the decision boundaries are a set of hyper-planes.
Consequently, a polyhedron can be used to describe the
output space. Assuming that f is a binary differentiable
classifier, to mislead the decision of f near the current point
xi, the minimal perturbation is the orthogonal projection of
xi onto the separating hyper-plane. At each iteration the
minimal perturbation of the linearized classifier is computed
as
argmin
δi
‖δi‖2 s.t. f(xi) +∇f(xi)T ri = 0 (1)
where δi is the minimum perturbation imposed on xi. Note
that neural networks are not actually linear, so the searching
will be repeated until a successful AE is found.
B. Threat Model: Adaptive Attacks
The adversary has not only full knowledge of the target
model (including both its architecture and parameters), but
also the existence and internal details of the detector, and can
adapt attacks accordingly. In this scenario, the attacker tries
to fool the neural-network-based classifier and the detector
at the same time. We consider adaptive attacks and evaluate
the resilience of our detector to them in Section VI.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Before presenting our defense scheme, we introduce the
image datasets and the corresponding target neural networks
on which we verify our key insights and evaluate the pro-
posed approach.
Image datasets. We generate AEs using two popular
datasets: CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, both of which are widely
used in image classification tasks. In particular, for Ima-
geNet, we adopt the ILSVRC2012 samples to keep consistent
with the prior state-of-the-art AE detector [23].
Target neural network models. (1) For CIFAR-10, we
use two neural networks as the target models: a 32-layered
ResNet model [18] (denoted as ResNet32), and a model
structure described in [6] (denoted as Carlini). We train
these two target neural network models from scratch, and
their accuracies are 91.96% and 78.86%, respectively. (2)
For ImageNet we re-use a 50-layered ResNet model [18]
provided in Keras [7] (denoted as ResNet50).
AE generation. Only those images that are correctly classi-
fied by the corresponding target model are used to generate
AEs used in our experiments. To generate the targeted AEs,
we designate the next class as the target class, similar to
many other AE detection works [23], [37], [39]. We only
keep the AEs that can successfully fool the target models—
that is, those perturbed images which fail to attack the
corresponding target model directly are not considered in
our evaluation. Moreover, all AEs are generated using the
open-source tool Foolbox [33].
Inpainting algorithm. We adopt Telea’s inpainting algo-
rithm [35] in our work. Since this inpainting algorithm needs
to solve an Eikonal equation, which is rarely differentiable
everywhere, the fast marching method is leveraged to find
the solution based on a finite difference approximation.
Thus, the inpainting algorithm adopted in our work is not
fully differentiable, resulting in a non-negligible obstacle for
adaptive attackers.
The experiments were performed on a computer equipped
with an Intel R© Core(TM) i9 CPU, 32 GB RAM and dual
GeForce R© GTX 1080 Ti GPU cards.
IV. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
A. Our Insights
Limitations of erasing (or adding noises) alone. Due
to the optimization nature of AE generation methods like
CW and DeepFool, maliciously manipulated pixels in an
AE are deliberately selected and perturbed. Thus, each of
the perturbed pixels plays a certain role in the attack. By
randomly erasing many pixels of an input image, it is likely
to corrupt some of the perturbed pixels or their surrounding
pixels in an AE, rendering the attack ineffective.
In the case of benign samples, however, the erasing
operation, which is equivalent to introducing random noises
to images, will significantly degrade the accuracy of the
classifier. The close correlation between the image quality
and the accuracy of image classification has been widely
studied in previous works [11], [9], [12]. They mention that
neural networks are susceptible to random noise distortions.
For example, Costa et al. [9] point out that “noises can
hinder classification performance considerably and make
classes harder to separate.”
Combining erasing and inpainting. We thus propose to
apply inpainting after the erasing operation. Inpainting is
a category of techniques for restoring damaged regions of
images. Given an erased region, an inpainting technique
infers and recovers its original pixels. Our insight is that
while inpainting works very well for recovering benign
samples, its recovering effect usually is not what the AE
attacker desires, since the maliciously perturbed regions,
once erased, can hardly be recovered to the attacker-intended
values.
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Fig. 3: Impacts of E&R on benign samples and AEs.
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We further design experiments to verify the two insights
in Section IV-B.
B. Verifying Our Insights
From CIFAR-10, we randomly select 1,000 images that
can be correctly classified by ResNet32. As shown in Fig-
ure 3(a), after randomly erasing 50∼150 (around 5%∼15%)
of the pixels in each image, without inpainting, the classifica-
tion accuracy significantly degrades from 100% to the range
from 24.2% (when erasing 15%) to 35.9% (when erasing
5%), which verifies that erasing alone harms the classification
accuracy for benign images significantly. By contrast, with
inpainting applied, the classification accuracy recovers to the
range from 90.5% to 96.6%.
Besides, we use the CW algorithm to generate three AEs
for each benign image with three different confidence levels
(κ = 0.0, 0.4, and 1.0, respectively). All the AEs successfully
fool the ResNet32 model. As shown in Figure 3(b), after
randomly erasing 50∼150 (around 5%∼15%) of the pixels
in each AE and then restoring them using inpainting, the
success rate of attacks dramatically decreases from the
original 100% to the range from 3.1% to 7.1%.
Similar results can be observed on the ImageNet dataset as
well. (1) Specifically, we randomly select 1,000 images from
ImageNet that can be correctly classified by the ResNet50
model. For example, after erasing and restoring 5% of the
pixels in each image, the classification accuracy stays at
96.3%. (2) On the other hand, when we apply the same eras-
ing and restoring operations to the 1,000 AEs generated from
these benign images, the success rate of attacks decreases
from 100% to around 4.1%.
Therefore, it can be concluded that E&R has very small
impacts on benign samples, but has much larger impacts on
AEs, demonstrating a noticeable distinction.
C. Approach Details
Based on our insights, we propose a novel AE detection
approach, named E&R, that exploits such a distinction and
implement it in a prototype system, called THEMIS, as shown
in Figure 4. (1) Given an input image I0, we randomly erase
λ pixels of it to create a deteriorated image I . This step is
repeated for n times to obtain a sequence of deteriorated
images {I1, I2, · · · , In}, using the idea of sampling. The
intuition behind it is that even if an AE “luckily” evades
the detection once, it is very unlikely for it to hide itself
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Fig. 5: Visualization of feature vectors.
throughout the multiple samples. (2) Next, an inpainting
technique is leveraged to produce a corresponding sequence
of restored images {I ′1, I ′2, · · · , I ′n}. (3) Finally, we feed
both the input image I0 and the sequence of restored images
{I ′1, I ′2, · · · , I ′n} into a target neural network, and collect all
the classification results.
Given an image in CIFAR-10, its classification result is
a vector ∈ R10 (since there are 10 classes in the dataset).
We simply concatenate all the classification-result vectors
for both I0 and {I ′1, I ′2, · · · , I ′n} to obtain a feature vector
∈ R10×(n+1) for training the AE classifier.
Given an image from the ImageNet, its classification result
is a vector ∈ R1000 (since there are 1,000 classes in the
dataset). Thus, the number of features to be fed to our classi-
fier is 1000×(n+1), which is too large. To make the training
of our classifier more feasible, Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) is performed on the classification results of I0 and
{I ′1, I ′2, · · · , I ′n}, to reduce the dimensionality to a lower
value d. Unless otherwise specified, we set d to 10 (1% of
the original dimensionality) to keep consistent with CIFAR-
10. Note that the number of principal components should
be less than both the number of features and the number
of samples, when solving PCA based on the truncated SVD
(singular value decomposition). In our case, the number of
samples is n+1; we thus let n = 11 (we discuss the impact
TABLE I: Performance of THEMIS. Cells with shading are
results using SVM, and cells without shading AdaBoost.
Dataset Target FPR Detection RateModel κ=0.0 κ=0.4 κ=1.0
CIFAR-10
Carlini 0.4% 100% 100% 100%0.0% 99.8% 99.9% 99.7%
ResNet32 2.8% 99.6% 99.7% 99.7%0.8% 99.0% 99.2% 98.9%
ImageNet ResNet50 3.2% 97.6% 98.1% 98.5%1.4% 98.4% 98.5% 98.9%
of n’s values with detailed experimental results in Section V-
C). We concatenate the vectors of principal components for
both I0 and {I ′1, I ′2, · · · , I ′n} to obtain a feature vector for
training our classifier.
We train our AE classifier using two supervised learning
techniques: AdaBoost [13] and SVM [8] with the RBF (radial
basis function) kernel.
The value of the parameter λ is set to 10% of the pixels
in our implementation. We adopt this value for two reasons.
(1) As shown in Figure 3, when 10% of the pixels are
erased and restored, it harms the success rate of AEs most
heavily, without degrading the classification accuracy for
benign samples significantly. (2) The inpainting algorithm
we adopt performs very well when the portion of corrupted
pixels in an image is less than 15% [35].
It is worth mentioning that λ = 10% leads to an enormous
randomness pool. Take an image in CIFAR-10 as an example,
the size of which is 32×32. With λ=100 (≈ 10% of the
pixels), the number of unique masks is around 7.7×10140.
It is thus very unlikely for an attacker to correctly predict
which mask is used.
Visualization of feature vectors. The feature vectors due
to 1,000 benign samples from the ImageNet dataset and
the corresponding 1,000 AEs are visualized in Figure 5,
which shows only three principal components. We have
two observations. (1) While the feature vectors of benign
samples, before and after the E&R operations, are close
(Figure 5(a)), those of AEs, before and after the same
operations, form two clusters far apart (Figure 5(b)). This
is consistent with our experiments shown in Figure 3 and
verifies our insights once again. (2) PCA is effective in
preserving features that help distinguish benign samples from
AEs.
V. EVALUATION
A. Performance Under CW Attacks
To train the detector, we firstly prepare datasets including
negative (i.e., benign samples) instances from CIFAR-10
and ImageNet and positive ones (i.e., AEs). For each target
model, we adopt the CW L2 algorithm to generate AEs;
and for each confidence level (i.e., κ = 0.0, 0.4, and 1.0),
we generate 5,000 successful AEs. Accordingly, we prepare
15,000 benign images which all can be correctly classified.
In the dataset, 80% of instances are used for training, and
the remaining 20% are used for testing.
We evaluate the performance of THEMIS in terms of
detection rate and false positive rate (FPR). The detection
rate is defined as the ratio of the number of successfully
detected AEs to the total number of AEs. FPR refers to the
fraction of the negative testing data (i.e., benign samples) that
is misclassified as positive (i.e., AEs). As shown in Table I,
the proposed technique achieves very high detection rates
(up to 100% on CIFAR-10, and 98.9% on ImageNet) with
low FPR values. The results are stable across different target
models, confidence levels, and classification methods.
Comparison with the prior work. We compare THEMIS
with the state-of-the-art AE detector—NIC [23]. Their ex-
periments only examine κ = 0.0, which is the default setting.
With respect to CIFAR-10, NIC considers the Carlini target
model and obtains the detection rate 96% and FPR 4.2% (see
Table I in [23]), while our system achieves the detection
rate 99.8% and FPR 0%. With respect to ImageNet, NIC
considers the ResNet50 model and its detection rate is 96%
with FPR=14.6% (see Table I in [23]), while our detection
rate is 98.4% with FPR=1.4%. It is worth noting that the
distribution of adversarial and benign images is not balanced
in practice—most inputs should be benign. Thus, FPR is a
very important metric to evaluate the model performance: a
lower FPR indicates that the system makes fewer mistakes
for benign images. THEMIS is able to keep both a high
detection rate and a very low FPR.2
Target-model agnostic. We are interested in finding out
whether a detector trained using AEs targeting one model
can be directly used to detect AEs targeting another—that is,
whether it is target-model agnostic. We thus train our system
using AEs that target the Carlini model, and test it using AEs
that target ResNet32. As Table II shows, the detection rate is
as high as 100%. We then train the system using AEs that
target ResNet32, and test it using AEs that target Carlini; the
detection rate is as high as 99.9%. These results are based
on images from CIFAR-10. And, the experimental results
based on ImageNet are similar. Therefore, this experiment
not only confirms that THEMIS is target-model agnostic, but
also demonstrates that THEMIS has low risk of overfitting.
B. Performance Under DeepFool Attacks
While our focus is CW L2 attacks, we also seek to
understand whether the proposed technique is effective in de-
tecting L2 AEs generated using another leading algorithm—
DeepFool (see Section II-A.2). We use CIFAR-10 in this
experiment as a showcase. For each target model (ResNet32
and Carlini), 15,000 successful AEs and the corresponding
benign samples are prepared. We use 80% of the data to train
the detector and 20% to test the detector.
Table III shows the experimental results. Given the Carlini
model, our system obtains the detection rate 99.1% and FPR
0.4%, while NIC [23] obtains the detection rate 91.0% and
FPR 4.2% (see Table I in [23]). Thus, the performance of
2We intended to compare with [36] as well, which depicts the results in a
figure (Figure 6 in [36]). We wrote emails to the authors asking for numeric
results, but have not received responses up until the submission.
TABLE II: Target-model agnostic property of THEMIS.
Target Model Classifier Detection Rate(Train → Test) κ=0.0 κ=0.4 κ=1.0
Carlini→ResNet32 SVM 100% 100% 100%AdaBoost 97.9% 97.9% 98.2%
ResNet32→Carlini SVM 99.9% 99.9% 99.8%AdaBoost 99.7% 99.8% 99.6%
TABLE III: Performance of THEMIS evaluated on Deep-
Fool.
Target Classifier FPR DetectionRate
Carlini SVM 0.4% 99.1%AdaBoost 0.2% 98.1%
ResNet32 SVM 4.0% 99.5%AdaBoost 1.6% 99.6%
TABLE IV: Impacts of different values of n. Cells with shading are results using SVM, and cells without shading AdaBoost.
Dataset Target
n = 3 n = 5 n = 7
Model FPR Detection Rate FPR Detection Rate FPR Detection Rate
κ=0.0 κ=0.4 κ=1.0 κ=0.0 κ=0.4 κ=1.0 κ=0.0 κ=0.4 κ=1.0
CIFAR-10
Carlini 0.4% 100% 100% 100% 0.4% 100% 100% 100% 0.4% 100% 100% 100%0.0% 100% 100% 99.9% 0.0% 100% 99.9% 99.9% 0.0% 100% 100% 99.8%
ResNet32 3.6% 99.6% 99.6% 99.6% 3.3% 99.6% 99.6% 99.6% 2.9% 99.6% 99.7% 99.7%0.9% 99.2% 99.1% 98.5% 0.7% 99.2% 99.1% 99.0% 0.9% 99.3% 99.1% 98.9%
ImageNet ResNet50 9.8% 95.4% 95.1% 95.5% 4.7% 95.5% 95.8% 97.3% 3.6% 97.6% 98.1% 98.2%6.6% 93.1% 91.4% 93.8% 2.8% 96.5% 97.6% 97.2% 2.1% 97.9% 98.6% 98.6%
our system is significantly better than NIC. For the ResNet32
model, our system has the detection rate 99.6% with FPR
=1.6%; however, NIC did not consider ResNet32.
Transferability. We are also interested in the transferability
of our detector—whether THEMIS trained on one type of
AEs can be directly applied to detect another type of AEs
that are unseen during training. To verify it, we train THEMIS
using CW AEs with mixed confidence levels. Without loss
of generality, in the process of CW AE generation, we only
use Carlini as the target model. We test the trained system
using DeepFool AEs targeting ResNet32 and DeepFool AEs
targeting Carlini, and our system can achieve detection rates
97.1% and 96.2%, respectively. Thus, we can conclude the
proposed technique has very good transferability, that is, it
keeps effective in handling unseen AE generation methods.
Explanation. The two notable properties of THEMIS—
target-model agnostic and good transferability—can be at-
tributed to the unique advantage of the proposed approach:
regardless of the target model and the attack method, benign
samples and AEs show distinct sensitivities to the E&R
operations (see Section 4).
C. Value Selection for the Parameter n.
We use n = 11 in the previous experiments. Here,
we investigate the impacts of different values of n on the
detector’s performance. The results are shown in Table IV. To
compare with the results in Table I, all the AEs are generated
using the CW L2 algorithm as well. For CIFAR-10, which
has only 10 classes (thus no PCA is needed), varying the
value of n has little impacts. However, for ImageNet, the
value of n has noticeable impacts: when n increases, the
AE detection rate increases and FPR decreases. The reason
is that by increasing n, more principal components can be
extracted (see Section 4). However, when n > 11, the
performance improvement is negligible, probably because
the extra principal components do not provide useful features
for AE detection. Therefore, we adopt n = 11.
VI. RESILIENCE TO ADAPTIVE ATTACKS
In an adaptive attack threat model, an adversary knows the
existence and internal details of our detector and adapts the
attacks to bypass the detection. We thus seek to study the
resilience of THEMIS to adaptive attacks.
An AE detector can be categorized as either differentiable
or non-differentiable. Several previous works propose de-
fense mechanisms that apply differentiable transformations
to an image before detection or classification [27], [14],
[15], [36]. But attackers can circumvent these differentiable
defenses by “differentiating through them”—i.e., by taking
the gradient of a class probability regarding input pixels
through both the CNN and the transformation [31], [4],
[19]. This strategy, however, is inapplicable to bypassing
THEMIS. Due to the random-erasing and inpainting-based
restoring, our approach is not only non-differentiable but
involves tremendous randomness.
To bypass non-differentiable defences, Backward Pass
Differentiable Approximation (BPDA) is proposed [1]. To
handle defenses that employ randomized transformation to
the input (like ours), it applies Expectation over Trans-
formation [2] to compute the gradient over the expected
transformation to the input. However, in our approach the
erased pixels are randomly selected among all the image
pixels, and there are around 7.7×10140 unique masks (even
for a small image; see Section IV-C); thus, it is infeasible to
calculate the expected transformation. Moreover, THEMIS is
not only randomized but also non-differentiable; in this case,
it is unknown how to apply BPDA to bypassing THEMIS.
He et al. [19] describe a representative adaptive attack
method against non-differentiable defences, where an at-
tacker tries to circumvent the defensive approach by (a)
considering intermediate distorted images during optimiza-
tion and (b) exploring multiple diverse optimization paths.
Inspired by [19], we design similar adaptive attacks to
examine the resilience of our approach.
Adaptive AE generation. To that end, we modify the code
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Fig. 6: Success ratio of adaptive AEs.
of the CW algorithm [6], in order to adaptively generate AEs
that can bypass our detector. Specifically, after each iteration
in an optimization procedure, an intermediate distorted image
is obtained. We then check whether it can bypass our detec-
tor. For each image, we repeat the optimization procedure
for up to T times to explore different optimization paths
(for this purpose, we set a randomly initialized state at the
beginning of each optimization procedure). We set T = 100,
corresponding to around 300 seconds on average on our
machine. In comparison, the two works [36] and [19] use
around 75 and 180 seconds to generate adaptive AEs for
each image, respectively.
Given that adaptive CW AE generation is quite time-
consuming, without loss of generality, this experiment is
conducted on 500 images randomly selected from CIFAR-
10. During the AE generation, we let κ = 0.0, which
means that the resulting AE is classified as the target class.
As κ increases, the model classifies the resulting AE as
the attacker-desired label more likely. As a larger value
of κ imposes an extra constraint to attackers and lowers
the chance of successful adaptive attacks, we only consider
κ = 0.0.
Resilience results. We adopt the SVM-based detector, which
achieves a detection rate of 100% (Table I). This means that
no AEs can fool it without adaptive attacks.
Figure 6 shows that only 4% (that is, 20 AEs) of adaptive
AEs can bypass our detector. By contrast, similar adaptive
attacks [19] can bypass feature squeezing based AE detec-
tion [37] at a success rate of 100%. More importantly, the
first 50 times of the optimization path exploration attain the
success rate of 3.4%, while the second 50 times only increase
the success rate by 0.6%. It shows that the effect of adaptive
attacks grows very slowly as the attacker doubles his time.
We thus can conclude that our detection approach is not
only resilient to adaptive attacks based on differentiation-
based attack methods, but also difficult to bypass through
exploring many optimization paths.
VII. RELATED WORK
Countermeasures against AE attacks can be roughly di-
vided into two categories. The first category aims to eliminate
the influences of AEs by either rectifying them or fortifying
the target neural network itself. The second category is AE
detectors like our work. Given the large body of research on
AEs, this is not intended to be exhaustive.
A. Adversarial Influences Elimination
Adversarial training augments the training set with the
label-corrected AEs [38], [24]. Buckman et al. [3] pro-
pose using thermometer-encoded inputs to assist adversarial
training. Alternatively, Shield [10] enhances a model by re-
training it with multiple levels of compressed images using
JPEG, a commonly used image compression technique.
Another strategy is to pre-process the inputs before feeding
them to neural networks. For instance, the pixel deflec-
tion and a wavelet-based denoiser are combined to rectify
AEs [31]. Liao et al. [22] propose higher-level guided
denoisers aiming to remove the adversarial noise from inputs.
Some other methods adopt JPEG compression techniques
[32], [16] to filter out the information redundancy, which
otherwise provides living space for adversarial perturbations.
However, their accuracies under adaptive attacks are lack
of adequate evaluations. CIIDefence [17] proposes to use
image inpainting with wavelet based image denoising to
rectify the classification result. However, its inpainting mask
is guided by class activation maps which might be predicted
and exploited by an adaptive attacker.
B. Adversarial Examples Detection
Li et al. [21] extract PCA features after inner convolutional
layers of the DNN, and then use a cascade classifier to
detect AEs. Metzen et al. [27] train a CNN-based auxiliary
network. This light-weight sub-network works with the target
model to detect AEs. Some techniques apply pre-processors
on input images and use prediction mismatch strategy to
detect AEs. For example, Meng et al. [26] train an auto-
encoder as the image filter. If the predictions of an original
image and the corresponding processed one fail to match, the
input is adversarial. Similarly, Xu et al. [37] propose feature
squeezing to detect AEs by comparing the prediction for
the original input with that for the squeezed one. However,
adaptive attacks have successfully circumvented all of the
aforementioned detection methods [4], [5], [19].
Finally, Tian et al. [36] leverage image rotation and
shifting as pre-processors to construct a detector. Although
these operations can produce certain randomness to counter
some adaptive attacks, their randomness pool is very limited.
It only has 45 possible transformations. As a result, their
method can merely achieve a detection ratio of 70% under
adaptive attacks [36].
VIII. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
The proposed erasing and restoring approach works by
destruction of the carefully perturbed pixels. Attackers thus
may consider minimizing the number of perturbed pixels in
order to evade our detection. However, the prior work [39]
points out that L0 AE generation results in large amplitudes
of altered pixels, which can be exploited to locate and restore
most of the maliciously perturbed pixels. Therefore, how to
make a trade-off between the number of altered pixels and
TABLE V: Performance of integrating THEMIS with an
existing detector [39].
Classifier FPR Detection RateCW-L0 JSMA CW-L2 DFool
SVM 4.5% 98.8% 99.6% 97.2% 98.0%
AdaBoost 2.6% 98.8% 99.6% 96.4% 97.2%
their resulting amplitudes is an interesting direction that is
worth exploration for the AE generation purpose.
While our work focuses on detecting L2 AEs, it is easy
to combine our approach with other detectors that show
strengths in detecting other types of AEs, in order to build a
comprehensive hybrid detector; that is, an input is detected
as an AE if any of the integrated detectors reports so. To
illustrate this, as an example, we integrate our approach with
the detection approach proposed in [39] to build a new and
more universal detector that work for four different attacks,
including CW-L0, JSMA, CW-L2, and DeepFool. Table V
shows the performance of this hybrid detector.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have presented and verified our insight that L2 AEs are
sensitive to the erasing and restoring operations, while benign
samples are not. Exploiting this insight, we have proposed
a simple but very effective AE detection approach E&R.
It outperforms other state-of-the-art approaches regarding
both detection accuracies and FPR. Moreover, our detector is
target-model agnostic, keeps effective across different attack
methods, and is resilient to adaptive attacks.
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